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This research work has been concentrated on impact of social learning on the investment 
intensity. The investors can be faced with expected short-run profitability of new investment 
what can make inadequate influence on investor’s incentive to invest. The model what has 
bee used, supposed social environment of high investment activity thankfully to the 
speculative motive. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The link between social learning and investment is increasingly recognized. 
Intuitively, entrepreneurs might have an incentive to follow the behaviour of others because 
early investment is perceived to signal high profitability. But this does not explain the 
behaviour of early investors, who must invest before the profitability of new investment 
opportunities has been tested. One strand in the literature looks at how informational 
externalities influence the option value of delay and shows the irreversible investment 
opportunities can remain unexploited. In explaining why unambiguously profitable 
investment opportunities remain un exploited, this conventional view emphasizes the 
strategic substitutability of investments, the dominant effect of the downside risk associated 
with investment opportunities, and the negative effect of uncertainty on the incentive to 
invest. 
In the present paper has been tried to understand the interaction between social 
learning and investment, but we consider the case of reversible investments and highlight the 
influence of informational externalities on the option value of early investment.  The analysis 
illustrates how social learning might underline the observation of episodes of high 
investment activity before the profitability of new investment opportunities has been tested. 
Investment associated with the dot-com boom is one concentrate example of what 
the analysis of this paper can refer to. There is a common perception of a powerful first-
mover advantage in internet business. But it is not just about staking out a market; it is also 
about getting the “business model” right, which in turn relies on social learning about 
financial planning, quality control, a viable billing model and customer service. Furthermore, 
Internet retailers are willing to incur substantial short-run losses in the hope of being able to 
exploit their investments’ upside potential. Investments associated with the gentrification of 
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urban areas are another relevant example. It pays to move into a previously depressed 
neighbourhood before the often potential is revealed through a process of social learning. 
This analysis rests on important features of these examples. Specifically, 
equilibrium model of investment has been considered with the following features. First, new 
investment opportunities are short lived. This creates an opportunity cost of waiting, which 
endows early investment with an option value. Second, entrepreneurs can learn about the 
productivity of new investment opportunities by observing each other’s experience. The 
reversibility of investment decisions makes such information valuable and provides a 
channel for the expectation of the forthcoming information to influence the option value\e of 
early investment. 
In this context, we show that investment may result from a speculative motive, because 
it enables entrepreneurs to exploit the investment’s upside potential in the event that the 
forthcoming information indicates that it is profitable to do so. Accordingly, higher degrees 
of uncertainty raise the incentive to undertake investment opportunities. Furthermore, it is 
natural to view investments as strategic complements, because the prospect of social learning 
associated with higher investment levels raises the option value of early investment. 
Consequently, high investment levels might arise as an equilibrium outcome when they 
would not be justified on the basis of the expected short-run profitability of new investment 
opportunities alone. However, to a naïve observer who fails to account for the influence that 
the prospect of social learning has on the option value of early investment, this type of 
equilibrium outcome may seem incorrectly, to be characterized rather as an episode 
associated with irrational exuberance. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
Each of N agents must decide whether or not to undertake an investment project 
that lasts for two periods. Agent i’ s one-time cost of the investment is ci, where 
0<c1<c2<…<cn. The exploitation of the new investment opportunity generates profits θ + ε’i, 
in the first period, where  θ is average profitability. In addition, those entrepreneurs who 
invested in the first period, and only they acquire the option to produce in the second period 
and collect profits equal to θ’ = θ + ε’i, where ε’i are independent random variables jointly 
normally distributed, with mean zero and variance δ2ε. The critical assumption that waiting is 
irreversible is a simple device to endow investment with an option value. It will allow us to 
invest, abstracting from the well understood influence of informational spillovers on the 
option value of delay.  
Entrepreneurs have ex ante probability distribution over the average profitability of the 
investment project. For simplicity, it is assumed that θ is normally distributed with mean θ’’ 
and variance Σ. At the end of the first period, investors observe the returns to all investment 
activities. Under these assumptions all payoff-relevant information is summarized by  
 
  N 
 K =  Σ  ki 
  I=1 
 





        N 
R   =   1/K Σ ki (θ + εi) = θ + 1/ki  εi 
       I=1 
 
Where ki when agent i invests and ki otherwise, K is the number of investors, and R 
denotes average profits. 
Since θ and R are jointly normally distributed, we know that the conditional distribution of θ’ 
given R is normal with mean. 
E[θ’/R] = (1  –  Σ / Σ + K-1 δ2ε) Σ + δ2ε ;   
And variance    Var[θ’|R] = (1 – Σ / Σ+ K-1 δ2ε) Σ + δ2ε 
While the updating rules are standard, the important feature is that higher levels of 
investment activity generate more informative signals. This is reflected in the fact that Var 
[θ’|R] declines with K. 
 
3. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
If investment decisions were irreversible, the value of the investment project would 
be V = 2 θ’’, and agent i would invest when V>Ci. When investment is reversible, however, 
the presence of informational spillovers is important because the value of the investment 
project depends on the expectation about the forthcoming information. In the second period, 
production will take place when E [θ’|R] =/> 0, since the cost of investment Ci is, then, 
already sunk. Thus, either all first-period investors produce in the second period or no one 
does. The value of the investment project is the sum of the expected short-run profitability 
and the option value of investment, 
V’(K) =  θ’’ + E [max{0,E[θ’|R]}, 
 Where K is the expected level of investment, which in equilibrium coincides with 
actual investment. Since Waiting is irreversible, agent i will invest when V(K) > ci’ 
 Speculative investment 
The main implication of the model is that V(K) increases with K. Consequently, 
investment activities are strategic complements and K going {2,…,N-1} is an equilibrium 
outcome if and only if ck ≤ V(K) < V(K+1) < ck+1. Similarly, K = 0 is an equilibrium 
outcome if and only if V(1) <= c1 and K = N is an equilibrium outcome if and only if V(N) ≥ 
cN. Existence of equilibrium follows from Tarski’s fixed-point theorem (Milgrom and 
Roberts1990). 
To see why V(K) is increasing with K, note first that an increase in K causes a 
mean-preserving spread in the distribution of the posterior expectation E[θ’/R]. It is 
sufficient to note that: 
E[E’(θ’|R)] = e’[θ’], and Var[E θ’|R] = Σ2 / Σ+K-1 δ2ε  ,which is increasing in K. 
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Thus, the posterior expectation becomes more dispersed as K increases. It is worth 
noting that, as K increase, the signal becomes more precise ex post. Accordingly, recall that 
Var[θ’|R] declines with K. However, the incentive to invest is influenced by the ex ante 
distribution of the posterior expectation E[θ’/R] when R is regarded as a random variable; 
and as K increases, more weight is put on the signal rather than on the prior. Thus, the 
important feature is that higher levels of investment imply, ex ante, a more dispersed 
posterior expectation. That V(K) is increasing with K follows immediately from the 
convexity of max {0,E[θ’|R]}. 
This result highlights the speculative nature of investment; by investing, 
entrepreneurs are, in effect, taking positions in the hope of being able to exploit the 
investment’s upside potential in the event that the forthcoming information indicates that it is 
profitable to do so. These investments obey a speculative motive in the same sense that 
inventories that are held in order to avoid stock-outs are speculative. It is worth nothing that, 
in effect, entrepreneurs behave as if they were risk lovers - even though they are risk neutral 
by assumption. Intuitively, their incentive to invest rises with higher investment levels, 
because they indicate that the posterior expectation E[θ’|R] will be more sensitive to the 
realization of the signal, which in turn raises the option value of investment. 
It should be noted that the characterization of investment as speculative is 
appropriate in this context because informational spillovers influence the option value of 
investment. For a comparison, consider the alternative scenario where investment is 
irreversible, in that first-period investors do not have the option not to produce in the second 
period, but entrepreneurs have the option to wait for one period and invest in the second 
period. E [max {0,E[θ’|R]}] is now the option value of waiting, whereas the value of 
investing in the first period is simply V=2θ. Consequently, the expectation of higher “K” 
lowers the entrepreneurs’ incentive to invest, and investments therefore are strategic 
substitutes. 
Two other points are worth noting. First, emphasis is not on investment as a 
problem of individual learning by experimentation. In particular, our analysis of equilibrium 
with positive investment goes through if the parameters of the problem are such that V(1)<c1 
so that no agent is willing to invest in isolation and, thus, K=0 is always an equilibrium 
outcome. This will be the case, for example, when θ’’ and Σ are sufficiently low1. Second, 
emphasis is also not on the entrepreneurs’ ability to strategically influence the behaviour of 
others, since learning from others is only valuable provided that an agent invested in the first 
place2. 
a. Coordination 
In general, there may be multiple equilibrium, which are Pareto ranked according to 
K. In particular, coordination failures may occur because the expectation of low levels of 
investment activity interferes with the flow of information, thereby depressing the option 
value of investment. This, is turn, makes possibility of low levels of investment in the 
                                            
1 V is increasing in θ’’ and Σ. The first property follows from the fact that max {0,E[θ’|R]} is a non-
decreasing function of θ’’, together with the fact that the E[θ’|R], when θ’’ = θ1’’, is stochastically lager 
than it is when θ’’ = θ2’’, whenever θ1’’> θ2’’. The second property follows from the convexity of max 
{0,E[θ’|R]}, together with fact that an increase in Σ causes a mean-preserving spread in the distribution 
of E[θ’|R]. 
2 See Aghion et al. (1991) for a discussion of individual learning by experimentation and Bolton and 
Harris (1999) for model of strategic experimentation. 
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present context is different from that underlying strategic delay (e.g., Charley and Gale 
1994). Here, entrepreneurs are not investing because they expect others not to invest, not 
because they area waiting to learn from the behaviour of others. 
A particularly interesting feature of equilibrium behaviour is that the coordination 
of investment activities becomes more relevant when expected productivity is relatively 
lower. Comparing the value of the reversible investment project with its value when 
investment is reversible, 
V’(K) =  V + E [max{0,E[θ’|R]}] – θ’’, 
It has been seen that V (K) exceeds V by an amount equal to the value of the 
forthcoming information. That the value of information is positive follows from Jensen’s 
inequality. When θ’’ is sufficiently high, the value of investment stems, in effect, from the 
high expected productivity and thus from the high value of v= 2 θ’’. In particular, since 
information is valuable, investment is optimal for agent “i” when V>Ci. Therefore. Let 
suppose that V<ci. For at leas some i=1,…,N. Instead, when θ’’ is sufficiently low, the value 
of investment stems from the value of the forthcoming information. It is then that the 
possibility of high levels of investment becomes interesting. In particular, a naïve observer 
who fails to take account of the influence that the prospect of social learning has on the 
option value of investment then be tempted to incorrectly attribute some equilibrium 
outcomes irrational exuberance. For example, the expectation of high levels of investment 
may be self-fulfilling, even though the short-run profitability of investment projects is 
expected to be negative. 
b. Uncertainty 
For concreteness, let focus on the equilibrium that achieves the highest level of 
investment. An implication of the model is that speculative investment becomes more 
attractive as the level of uncertainty increases. This is reflected in the fact that k is non-
decreasing in Σ.3 The interest of this result lines in its contrast with the conventional view 
associated with emphasis on the option value of delay, which suggests that increases in 
uncertainty will discourage investment.4 The interest of this result lies in its contrast with the 
conventional view associated with emphasis on the option value of delay, which suggests 
that increases in uncertainty will discourage investment5. The difference is better understood 
once one notes that an increase in Σ involves simultaneous increase in the downside risk of 
investment and an increase in its upside potential. When investments are irreversible and 
entrepreneurs have the option to wait, then the increase in the downside risk is the dominant 
effect and the increase in Σ raises the option value of waiting.  Here, instead, the increase in 
the investment’s upside potential is the dominant effect and the increase in Σ raises the 
option value of investment. A second difference is that the influence of uncertainty on 
speculative investment is amplified by the multiplier effect associated. 
 
 
                                            
3 V is increasing in Σ, as shown in footnote 1. Standard monotone comparative static’s (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1990) indicate that the equilibrium level of investment K must be non-decreasing in Σ. 
4Has to be seen Bernanke (1983) for an early discussion in a model where the arrival of information is 
exogenous.  
5 Cooper and John 1988 for an insightful analysis of models with strategic complementarities. 
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4. EXTENSIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The coexistence of high levels of investment and negative shot-run return might be 
thought to depend on the absence of ex post limited liability. In order to address this issue, 
has to be supposed that legal restrictions ensure that investors can limit second-period losses 
to L>0. Then the value of investment becomes  
V’(K) = θ’’ + E [max{0,E[max{-L, θ”} | R]}] . 
As L becomes Large, V(K) will be given by equation V’(K) = θ’’+E[max{0,E 
[θ’|R]}]. As L approaches zero, the option value of investment becomes E[max{0,E[max{0, 
θ’}|R]}] = E[max{0, θ’}], which is independent of K. This is because second-period 
production becomes a dominant action and thus information has no value when the 
maximum loss L coincides with the opportunity cost of second-period production, which we 
have normalized to zero. This indicates the robustness of our results to the presence of 
limited liability and it underscores the fact that our analysis relies on the presence of some 
downside risk and the non-trivial option to exploit the upside potential of investment 
opportunities. Here, because the opportunity cost of second-period production has been 
normalized to zero, this the case when L>0 and E[max{-L, θ’}|R]<0 for some realization of 
R, in which case V remains convex and information has positive value. 
The main implications of the analysis extend to the more realistic case of multiple 
investment opportunities. This further illustrates the role of informational spillovers as a 
coordination device. For simplicity, has to be consider a “traditional” investment 
opportunity, described by {θ’’, Σ}=( θ’’T, ΣT}, and a “new investment opportunity, {θ’’, 
Σ}=( θ’’N, ΣN}, suppose that both projects involve the same cost ci  for i=1,…,N. the two 
projects particular, entrepreneurs may choose not to invest in either project, in which case 
they save the cost ci and enjoy the returns to the project that may be thought as being 
described by { θ’’, Σ}={0, 0}. In this context, equilibrium behaviour requires that all 
investors undertake the same project. To see this, let KT and KN denote investment levels 
associated with each of the projects, with K = KT + KN ≤ V (KN + 1) and V (KN) ≥ V (KT + 
1). But, these two conditions are inconsistent with the fact that V is increasing. Thus, 
investment will be concentrated in only one type of project. 
Now let θ’’T>θ’’N and ΣT<ΣN, so that new investment opportunities are 
characterized by lower and more uncertain returns. Then consider the influence of an 
increase in θ’’N on the equilibrium that supports the Pareto-superior level of investment, 
which is associated with the highest V(K). Suppose that, initially, K=KT, thus, a small 
enough increase in  θ’’N will have no impact on K. When θ’’N becomes sufficiently high, 
however, there will be a switch to the new investment opportunities and investment will 
change from K=KT to K=K’T≥ KT, even though average profitability is expected to fall from θ’’T to 
θ’’N. 
The entrepreneur’s incentive has been considered to invest when investors learn 
from each other’s experience, but when early investors must commit resources before 
profitability has been tested. The analysis has shown how the prospect of social learning 
might facilitate the emergence of high levels of speculative investment activity, in which 
case the expected short-run profitability of new investment opportunities might inadequately 
reflect the entrepreneurs’ incentives to invest. As discussed in the introduction, investment 
associated with the dot-com boom and with the rise of commercial activity in previously 
depressed urban areas are two concrete examples where our stylized model of investment 
might be particularly relevant.  
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This analysis brings attention to the effect of social learning on the incentive to 
undertake reversible investment opportunities. The effect of informational spillovers on the 
option value of investment emphasized the strategic complementarily of investments, the 
dominant effect of the upside potential of investment opportunities, and the positive effect of 
uncertainty on the entrepreneur’s incentive to invest. In contrast, the conventional view has 
focused on the influence of social learning on the incentive to undertake irreversible 
investment, accordingly, the effect of informational spillovers on the option value of delay, 
the strategic substitutability of investments, the dominant effect of the downside risk 
associated with investment opportunities, and the negative effect of uncertainty on the 
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U ovom se radu istražuje učinak sociološkog saznanja na intenzitet investiranja. Investitori 
bivaju suočeni sa očekivanom kratkoročnom profitabilnošću nove investicije što može imati 
neadekvatan utjecaj na investitorov budući poticaj za investiranjem. Model koji je korišten 
predtpostavlja društveno okruženje za velika investiranja zahvaljujući spekulativnom motivu. 
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